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The	great	demographic	reversal	and	what	it	means	for
the	economy
The	rise	of	China	to	the	status	of	economic	superpower	has	been	the	dominant	narrative	of	the	last	three	decades.
China’s	rise	as	the	main	feature	of	globalisation,	in	conjunction	with	a	beneficial	sweet	spot	in	demography,	drove
output	up	and	inflation	down	in	the	advanced	economies.	But	these	trends	are	now	reversing.	China’s	economic
success	depended	on	many	factors,	a	strong	historical	social	and	cultural	background,	political	single-mindedness,
a	flexible	and	competent	labour	force,	fed	by	internal	migration,	capital	controls,	developing	satisfactory
infrastructure	and	absorption	of	Western	technological	know-how.	But	China’s	greatest	contribution	to	global	growth
is	now	past.	Its	working	age	population	is	now	shrinking,	while	the	ranks	of	the	old	expands.
This	great	demographic	reversal	will	lead	to	a	return	of	inflation,	higher	nominal	interest	rates,	lessening	inequality
and	higher	productivity,	but	worsening	fiscal	problems,	as	medical,	care	and	pension	expenditures	all	increase	in
our	ageing	societies.	Below	are	key	points	in	our	new	book.	They	are	the	executive	summaries	of	some	of	its
chapters.
Output	growth	will	decline
The	surge	in	the	labour	force	working	in	the	world’s	trading	system	in	previous	decades	is	now	reversing.	The	ratio
of	the	retired-old	to	workers	will	worsen,	as	longevity	out-distances	retirement	age,	particularly	in	those	countries
which	earlier	grew	fastest.	Overall	output	growth	depends	on	a	combination	of	the	growth	rate	of	the	working
population	and	their	productivity.	With	the	former	declining,	unless	offset	by	a	major	rise	in	the	participation	rates	of
the	elderly,	growth	has	to	be	based	on	higher	productivity	per	worker.	While	there	are	some	reasons	for	hoping	that
we	may	improve	on	recent	disappointments	on	this	latter	front,	we	are	reasonably	confident	that	overall	output
growth	will	now	generally	decline.
Dependency,	dementia	and	the	coming	crisis	of	caring
Extra	longevity	is	not	such	a	boon	if	it	is	accompanied	by	enhanced	morbidity.	Ageing	leads	to	a	greater	incidence
of	neuro-degenerative	diseases,	e.g.	Alzheimer’s	and	Parkinson’s.	Unlike	their	success	with	cancer	and	cardio-
vascular	ills,	medicine	has	been	largely	unsuccessful	in	dealing	with	dementia;	research,	diagnosis	and	treatment
are	all	under-funded	and	unsatisfactory.	The	costs	of	such	diseases	are	bound	to	grow	rapidly,	partly	by	diverting	a
growing	proportion	of	the	available	workforce	into	care	for	the	dependent	old.	Even	then,	the	availability	of	properly
trained	carers	will	probably	be	insufficient,	leading	to	a	greater	burden	for	the	affected	old	and	their	families.
Combine	this	with	the	rising	age	of	having	children	and	the	result	is	a	markedly	changing	life-cycle	pattern,	one	that
we	argue	will	reduce	the	household	savings	ratio.
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The	resurgence	of	inflation	
The	great	demographic	reversal	and	the	retreat	from	globalisation	will	bring	back	stronger	inflationary	pressures	–
this	is	our	highest	conviction	view.	Worsening	dependency	ratios	naturally	raise	inflation.	The	lesser	availability	of
labour	at	home	and	abroad	will	serve	to	restore	the	(previously	diminished)	bargaining	power	of	labour.	It	will	also
end	up	raising	the	equilibrium	natural	rate	of	unemployment.	Households	will	save	less,	and	invest	more	in	housing,
than	some	mainstream	models	suggest.		The	non-financial	corporate	sector	may	have	to	invest	more	to	hold	down
unit	labour	costs,	though	we	are	agnostic	about	the	various	causes	for	recent	low	investment	rates.	But	we	doubt
that	politicians,	facing	rising	health	and	pension	costs,	will	be	prepared	or	able	to	raise	taxes	enough	to	equilibrate
the	economy	via	fiscal	policy.
The	determination	of	(real)	interest	rates	during	the	great	reversal
The	rising	inflation	that	we	foresee	in	the	future	will	raise	nominal	interest	rates,	but	not	necessarily	real	interest
rates.	There	are	multiple	factors	influencing	the	equilibrium	real	interest	rate,	r*.		We	doubt	whether	the	prospective
slowdown	in	world	growth	will	depress	r*.		While	slower	growth	will	tend	to	reduce	both	ex	ante	saving	and	ex	ante
investment	in	the	private	sector,	we	tend	to	believe	that	savings	will	fall	by	more.	If	so,	the	public	sector	should
ideally	move	back	towards	primary	surplus	to	balance	the	economy.	But	rising	health	and	pension	costs,	and	the
political	unpopularity	of	tax	increases,	will	hinder	that.	Political	pressures	may	force	central	banks	to	hold	short-term
rates	below	the	level	consistent	with	inflation	targets,	thus	keeping	short	real	rates	low,	while	market	pressures	lead
to	stronger	increases	in	long	rates,	both	nominal	and	real.		The	yield	curve	will	become	much	more	upwards
sloping.
Inequality	and	the	rise	of	populism
After	two	centuries	of	growing	global	inequality,	faster	growth	in	Asia	compared	to	the	West	has	seen	this	trend
start	to	recede.	Inequality	within	countries,	however,	has	generally	risen,	though	perhaps	more	in	perception	than	in
fact.	The	allocation	of	responsibility	for	this,	between	technology,	growing	monopoly	power,	and	the	surge	in	labour
supply	due	to	globalisation	and	demography,	is	complex	and	uncertain.	One	might	have	expected	such	rising
within-country	inequality	to	benefit	left-leaning	political	parties,	(and	it	did	in	Latin	America).		But	in	North	America
and	Europe	it	has	led	to	rising	support	for	right-wing,	populist	parties.	We	attribute	this	largely	to	the	public’s
distaste	for	large-scale	immigration.	Immigration	is	an	issue	that	sharply	divides	the	views	of	mainstream
economists,	who	mainly	welcome	it,	and	the	public	at	large,	who	want	it	to	be	restricted.
A	switch	from	debt	to	equity	finance?
The	best	way	to	reduce	excessive	debt	leverage,	and	perhaps	to	rescue	capitalism,	is	to	remove	the	fiscal
advantages	of	debt	over	equity	finance.	There	should	be	a	greater	equity	element	in	both	housing	and	student
financing,	and	the	public	sector	should	start	issuing	nominal	income	bonds.	But	the	main	change	should	occur	in
corporate	finance.	Here	there	are	two	proposals	on	the	table,	an	allowance	for	corporate	equity	and	destination-
based	cash	flow	taxation.	A	general	problem,	however,	is	that	the	remuneration	and	incentive	structure	for
corporate	managers	encourages	them	to	maximise	the	return	on	equity	(RoE),	which	is	most	easily	achieved	by
increasing	leverage.	We	suggest	a	reformulation	of	limited	liability	for	those	equity	holders	with	the	power	to
influence	corporate	strategy,	in	order	to	mitigate	this	concern.
Future	policy	problems:	old	age	and	taxes,	and	the	monetary-fiscal	clash
Demographic	trends	will	place	increasing	pressures	on	public	policies,	fiscal	and	monetary.	An	ageing	society	will
require	greater	medical	and	pension	expenditure,	just	as	a	declining	workforce	is	slowing	output	growth,	and	hence
taxable	capacity.		We	consider	four	ways	for	enhancing	taxable	capacity:	1)	reforming	the	basis	of	corporation	tax;
2)	land	value	taxation;	3.	a	carbon	tax;	4)	destination-based	cash	flow	tax.
But	we	doubt	whether	politicians	will	be	able	to	raise	taxes	enough	to	equilibrate	the	economy.	Hence	inflation	will
rise.	That	will	lead	central	banks	to	raise	nominal	interest	rates	in	pursuit	of	their	inflation	targets.	In	turn,	that	will
put	them	at	loggerheads	with	ministers	of	finance	and	prime	ministers/presidents,	especially	those	of	a	populist
inclination.	In	any	such	conflict	between	politicians	and	central	bankers,	we	would	back	the	former	to	win	–	that
conflict	has	already	begun.
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Swimming	against	the	(main)stream
From	1750	until	1950	inflationary	expectations,	and	nominal	and	real	interest	rates,	remained	roughly	constant,	in
the	UK	at	least,	while	inflation	was	a	function	of	occasional	wars	and	the	vagaries	of	harvest.	After	the	1950s	there
was	a	strong	upwards	trend	in	inflation,	inflationary	expectations	and	nominal	interest	rates	(1950	–	1980),	followed
by	an	extraordinary	downwards	trend	in	inflation,	inflationary	expectations	and	both	nominal	and	real	interest	rates
(1980	–	2020).	The	earlier	trend	can	be	ascribed	to	a	doomed,	but	well	intentioned,	attempt	to	keep	unemployment
below	its	rising	natural	rate,	with	the	monetary	regime	allowing	that	to	happen.	We	ascribe	the	subsequent
downwards	trend	to	underlying	demography	and	globalisation	factors.	Given	the	expansionary	intent	of	monetary
policies,	it	is	hard	to	claim	that	such	disinflation	was	a	monetary	phenomenon.	But	in	that	case	the	forthcoming
reversal	of	the	previous	demographic	and	globalisation	trends	should	lead	to	a	revival	of	inflation	and	nominal	(but
not	necessarily	real)	interest	rates.	But	this	view	is	at	odds	with	most	current	mainstream	analysis,	even	of	those
who	do	focus	on	demography,	who	generally	continue	to	foresee	secular	stagnation,	‘lower	for	longer’.	We	outline
why	they	differ	from	the	mainstream.	Our	view	of	the	future	is	not	encouraging,	but	it	is	coherent	and	plausible.
♣♣♣
Notes:
This	blog	post	is	based	on	executive	summaries	of	the	chapters	in	the	authors’	book	The	Great	Demographic
Reversal:	Ageing	Societies,	Waning	Inequality,	and	an	Inflation	Revival,	co-written	with	Manoj	Pradhan.
The	post	expresses	the	views	of	its	author(s),	not	the	position	of	LSE	Business	Review	or	the	London	School
of	Economics.
Featured	image	by	pasja1000,	under	a	Pixabay	licence
When	you	leave	a	comment,	you’re	agreeing	to	our	Comment	Policy
Charles	Goodhart,	CBE,	FBA	is	emeritus	professor	of	banking	and	finance	with	the	Financial
Markets	Group	at	LSE,	having	previously,	1987-2005,	been	its	deputy	director.	Until	his	retirement	in
2002,	he	had	been	the	Norman	Sosnow	professor	of	banking	and	finance	at	LSE	since	1985.		Before
then,	he	had	worked	at	the	Bank	of	England	for	seventeen	years	as	a	monetary	adviser,	becoming	a
chief	adviser	in	1980.
	
Manoj	Pradhan	is	the	founder	of	the	independent	macroeconomic	research	firm	Talking	Heads
Macroeconomics.	based	in	London,	with	a	specialisation	in	the	analysis	of	global	and	emerging
markets	macroeconomic	trends,	and	their	implications	for	financial	markets.	He	has	a	Ph.D.	in
economics	from	the	George	Washington	University	and	a	Masters	in	Finance	from	the	London
Business	School.
	
	
LSE Business Review: The great demographic reversal and what it means for the economy Page 3 of 3
	
	
Date originally posted: 2020-09-18
Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/businessreview/2020/09/18/the-great-demographic-reversal-and-what-it-means-for-the-economy/
Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/businessreview/
